It is unknow whether the parties engaged the legal services from a business law lawyer in the transaction. Appellant building owner challenged an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, which granted respondent lis pendens recorders’ special motion to strike appellant’s complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16. In his slander of title action, appellant claimed that respondents erred in filing the notices of pending action.
Overview
The notices of pending action were filed in connection with two arbitration proceedings against appellant. The court held that a party to a pending arbitration could not record a notice of pendency of action without first filing a civil action in superior court. Moreover, to the extent that Civ. Code, § 880.260, conflicted with the statutes defining “action” and setting forth the requirements for the recording of a lis pendens, the court concluded that it had to defer to the statutes within the California Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, the filings of the lis pendens had a direct connection to the arbitration proceedings, which involved claims that affected title to and rights of possession of the building. Because no action in a court of law was pending at the time respondents filed the lis pendens, they improperly recorded the notices of pendency of action. It followed that the court was not persuaded by respondents’ reliance upon the litigation privilege, Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(4). Appellant offered evidence of its damages in opposition to respondents’ anti-SLAPP motion. Accordingly, respondents’ anti-SLAPP motion should have been denied.
Outcome
The court reversed the order granting respondents’ anti-SLAPP motion and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to enter and new and different order denying the motion.
Procedural Posture
Petitioner franchisor sought mandate relief from an order of respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which ruled that Washington state law applied to real party in interest franchisee’s suit alleging wrongful termination of its franchise.
Overview
The franchisor, which had its headquarters in Vancouver, granted a franchise for territories in the Los Angeles area. The parties’ franchise agreement specified the application of Washington state law and obligated the franchisee to pay a percentage of its gross revenue to the franchisor. Upon discovering that some revenue had not been reported, the franchisor terminated the agreement without an opportunity to cure. The franchisee alleged that the termination was in violation of Washington state law. Its attorney filed a declaration explaining that franchise agreements typically contained choice of law provisions to ensure consistent rules. The court held that a reasonable basis existed for the choice of law provision because of the franchisor’s proximity to Washington and the benefits of franchise uniformity. Because Wash. Rev. Code § 19.100.180(2)(j) provided greater protection from summary termination than Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 20020, 20021, subds. (a)-(k), the choice of law provision did not diminish the franchisee’s rights under the California Franchise Relations Act, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 20000 et seq. Thus, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 20010, did not bar its enforcement.
Outcome
The court denied the franchisor’s petition for writ of mandate.